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NORMS, ATTITUDES, AND COMPLIANCE 
Stephen R. Galoob and Adam Hill* 
GEOFFREY BRENNAN, LINA ERIKSSON, ROBERT E. GOODIN, & NICHOLAS 
SOUTHWOOD, EXPLAINING NORMS (2013). Pp. 290. Hardcover $55.00. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The connection between law and norms has been one of the most widely discussed 
issues in legal scholarship since at least the publication of Robert Ellickson’s seminal work 
on the subject.1 This topic has inspired (and, to an extent, unified) doctrinal scholars, legal 
theorists, economists, and sociologists. 
Yet despite the breadth of these discussions, legal scholars of norms have left many 
fundamental questions unresolved. What are norms? How do they affect what people do? 
Are norms mainly social phenomena, or do they include legal phenomena as well? 
Explaining Norms is a work of philosophy of social science by Geoffrey Brennan, 
Lina Eriksson, Robert Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood.2 (For the sake of convenience, 
we refer to the authors collectively as “BEGS.”) The book is a breakthrough, containing 
many important advances in thinking about norms. We use this review of Explaining 
Norms as an occasion to question the reductive, behaviorist definition of norms that pre-
dominates among legal scholars and influences much empirical legal research.  
Part I of this review discusses two foundational questions about norms: what are 
they, and what is it to comply with them? BEGS provide a powerful account of the nature 
of norms and offer several insights about compliance. 
Part II sets out the leading definition of norms in the legal literature, which we call 
“reductive behaviorism.” Reductive behaviorism sees norms primarily as patterns or reg-
ularities of behavior. An implication of this definition is that to behave in accordance with 
a norm is to comply with it. 
Part III deploys BEGS’s insights about compliance to identify two important phe-
nomena that reductive behaviorism leaves out. First, reductive behaviorism denies that 
norms could concern anything other than externally manifest behaviors, such as patterns 
                                                          
 *  Stephen Galoob is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Adam Hill is a 
Ph.D. candidate in the School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley. The authors wish to thank Sam 
Halabi, Matt Lamkin, Ethan Leib, Richard McAdams, Brian Sheppard, and Bob Spoo, and the editors of the 
Tulsa Law Review for their attention. Special thanks to David DiPianto, whose comments inspired revision of 
substantial portions of parts II and III. Galoob’s work was supported in part by a Dean’s summer research grant 
from the University of Tulsa College of Law.  
 1. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, STAN. 
L. REV. 623 (1986); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).  
 2. GEOFFREY BRENNAN ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS (2013) [hereinafter NORMS].  
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of deliberation. However, many norms do concern deliberation, so reductive behaviorism 
cannot describe how these norms operate. Second, complying with certain norms requires 
not only that someone behave and deliberate in accordance with the norm, but also that 
the norms (or some higher-order commitment involving the norms) factor into the agent’s 
deliberations. In these cases, to use BEGS’s terminology, compliance requires following a 
norm, rather than merely conforming to it. Yet, reductive behaviorism cannot appreciate 
any meaningful difference between conforming to and following a norm, let alone explain 
why some norms must be followed. Thus, reductive behaviorism provides an incomplete 
account of how norms work. BEGS’s insights can help remedy this conceptual deficiency 
and inspire improvements in the empirical study of norms.3  
 
I. TWO BIG QUESTIONS ABOUT NORMS 
Explaining Norms has three main parts. Part I analyzes the nature of norms. Part II 
addresses how norms emerge, persist, and change over time. Part III concerns compliance 
with norms. We elaborate (and criticize) the arguments in parts I and III of the book, which 
seem to be its farthest-reaching contributions. 
A. What are norms? 
1. Background 
BEGS articulate and defend an account that they call the “norms as normative atti-
tudes” view.4 Before discussing this view, two background observations are helpful to ex-
plain the ambitions of BEGS’s project. 
First, BEGS observe that norms have both a “normative” element and a “socio-em-
pirical” element.5 The normative element is that norms implicate and are made up of “nor-
mative principles,” which are presented as “general requirements” for those over whom 
the norm applies.6 This normativity distinguishes norms from statistical generalizations, 
which do not necessarily have any normative content.7 The socio-empirical element of 
norms means that they operate over and are “somehow accepted within” particular groups 
or communities.8 Whether a particular normative principle is actually the norm of a group 
is a “social fact” that is (at least in principle) subject to verification. This facticity depends 
on whether the principle has been accepted, not whether it is objectively valid. An objec-
tively invalid normative principle (such as the principle that young girls should not be 
educated) could nevertheless be the norm of a group if it were accepted within the group. 
For BEGS, a satisfactory definition of norms must explain both these normative and socio-
                                                          
 3. To be sure, the significance of this shortcoming for scholars will vary across types of empirical research. 
Some empirical research (e.g., purely data-driven projects) does not posit or rely on any definition of norms at 
all. The soundness of an underlying definition of norms might be immaterial for those projects.   
 4. NORMS, supra note 2, at 15.  
 5. Id. at 3.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 2.  
 8. Id. at 3.  
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empirical elements.9 
Second, BEGS analyze norms through the lens of rational choice theory, which is 
characteristic of much economic analysis. Rational choice theory assumes “that agents are 
preference satisfaction maximizers” and that the effects of norms are explained by “the 
content of those preferences.”10 This approach contrasts with some sociological ap-
proaches, which give pride of place to structural considerations in describing what norms 
are and how they operate. BEGS also adopt a specific picture about why people act that is 
associated with the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume.11 On this 
Humean picture of motivation, people act in order to satisfy their desires.12 
2. The “Norms as Normative Attitudes” View 
On the norms as normative attitudes view, norms are “clusters of normative atti-
tudes,” in that “[w]hat it takes for a . . . normative principle to be accepted in and hence to 
be the norm of a group is, at least in part, that a significant proportion of the members of 
that group have certain attitudes,” that these normative attitudes track (and are prompted 
by) the content of the norm, and that these attitudes meet certain standards of publicity.13 
More formally, a normative principle, P, is a norm within a group, G, if and only if: 
 
(i) a significant portion of the members of G have P-corresponding nor-
mative attitudes; and 
 
(ii) a significant proportion of the members of G know that a significant 
proportion of the members of G have P-corresponding normative atti-
tudes.14 
 
This definition involves several technical terms. “Normative attitudes” are a certain 
kind of principled judgment about the world. For BEGS, normative attitudes include judg-
ments about the normative status of actions (such as whether they are forbidden or re-
quired); normative expectations concerning the actions of others; reactive attitudes (such 
as resentment and indignation) and “dispositions to have such attitudes”; and attitudes that 
presuppose normative judgments, normative expectations, and reactive attitudes.15 A nor-
mative attitude “corresponds” to a principle when it “appropriately reflects the content and 
normative force” of that principle.16 BEGS leave open what counts as a “significant pro-
portion” of a population, and they allow that significance might vary for different types of 
norms.17 Nor do BEGS specify what it means for someone to “have” a normative attitude, 
                                                          
 9. Id. at 3-4.  
 10. Id. at 8.  
 11. Id. at 9, 33, 198-99.  
 12. Id. at 198-99 (citing MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM (1994)). The Humean picture of motivation 
also asserts that the reasons a person has or believes herself to have are “motivationally inert” and do not explain 
why she behaves in the ways that she does. Id. at 198. 
 13. Id. at 29.  
 14. Id. at 31. 
 15. Id. at 29.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 30. 
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although they deny that having a normative attitude necessarily prompts one to act in a 
particular way.18 
To illustrate the norms as normative attitude view, consider a normative principle 
like “ordinarily keep your promises.” This principle has been accepted in some communi-
ties, and so is a norm for those groups. If someone violates the principle (say, by breaking 
a promise solely in order to obtain a material gain), then she is judged by a significant 
proportion of the population to have acted wrongly and it is appropriate for the promisee 
to resent her violation. If these normative attitudes do not attach to a principle in a group, 
then the principle is not a norm for that group. In other words, “keep your promises” is not 
a norm in communities where breaking a promise does not occasion these kinds of critical 
judgments and attitudes. 
3. Four Aspects of the “Norms as Normative Attitudes” View 
Here are four aspects of the norms as normative attitudes view that contrast with the 
predominant definition of norms in the legal literature. First, the norms as normative atti-
tudes view is non-reductive because it invokes essentially normative concepts to explain 
why a normative principle is a norm. By contrast, BEGS contend, reductive approaches 
hold that whether a principle is a norm for a group turns on social facts that do not essen-
tially involve normative concepts.19 
Second, the norms as normative attitudes view treats normative attitudes as bed-
rock.20 If normative attitudes do not attach (in the right way, among the right people in a 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 38.  
 19. Id. at 28-29.   
 20. BEGS contrast the norms as normative attitudes view with two reductive approaches, which they call the 
“norms as practices” and “norms as desires” views. Id. at 15. 
  On the “norms as practices” view, a normative principle is a norm when a significant proportion of mem-
bers behave in a way that is consistent with the principle; this behavior is explained, in part, by group members 
having positive attitudes toward behavior that conforms with the principle; and these attitudes are a matter of 
common knowledge. Id. at 16. BEGS contend that, while norms and social practices typically go together, the 
latter are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the existence of the former. To show why practices are 
unnecessary, BEGS offer an example to illustrate the possibility that a norm could exist (in their example, a norm 
against urinating in public swimming pools), even though there is no widespread social practice of people be-
having in a way that conforms to it (that is, where people routinely urinate in public swimming pools). Id. at 20. 
BEGS argue that the norms as normative attitudes view can explain why there is a norm in this example: namely, 
because members have normative attitudes that correspond to the norm (e.g., the judgment that “one mustn’t 
urinate in public swimming pools” and a disposition to “disapprove of those who do”), even though the behavior 
of most members does not correspond to the norm. Id. at 31. 
  On the “norms as desires” view, norms are clusters of desires and (on some versions) beliefs about the 
desires of others. Id. at 22. BEGS focus Cristina Bicchieri’s account, which sees norms as clusters of “desire[s] 
to comply with [] normative principle[s],” conditional on others also complying with them and expecting com-
pliance. Id. at 23-24 (citing CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF 
SOCIAL NORMS (2006)). Here, too, BEGS provide examples to suggest that clusters of desires are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for the existence of a norm. In the case of “the Chastians,” virtually all the members of a group 
behave in a chaste manner, yet have a conditional desire to live under a norm that mandates unchaste behavior 
(should others behave unchastely and expect general behavior in this way). Id. at 25. BEGS contend that the 
Chastians do not have a norm of unchaste behavior, even though Bicchieri’s account would suggest that they do. 
Id. Likewise, BEGS invoke the case of “the Philanthropians” (who have a norm requiring donation of income, 
even though virtually all the members of the group prefer to spend their income on luxury goods) to argue that 
clusters of desires are insufficient to show the existence of a norm. Id. at 27-28. By contrast, the norms as nor-
mative attitudes view can explain why the Chastians do not have a norm of unchaste behavior (because the 
Chastians do not themselves have normative attitudes that correspond to the principle that one should behave 
unchastely), as well as why the Philanthropians have a norm regarding philanthropy (because they disapprove of 
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group) to a principle, then that principle is not a norm for that group. 
Third, the “core function” of norms is to facilitate accountability: norms allow group 
members to possess a “recognized right or entitlement to determine how one is to be-
have.”21 This position differs from the predominant view that norms primarily serve to 
facilitate coordination (by allowing groups to “reach[] mutually beneficial outcomes 
where [their] interests are fairly well aligned but where there are multiple different ways 
in which [they] could achieve such outcomes”) and/or cooperation (by allowing groups to 
reach “mutually beneficial outcomes” in situations where the interests of members “are 
pitted against one another, but not intractably so”).22 BEGS defend their position by argu-
ing that norms can be important even where facilitating cooperation or coordination is 
“either impossible or unimportant.”23 
Fourth, the norms as normative attitudes view describes norms generally. BEGS dis-
tinguish between “formal” and “non-formal” norms.24 Legal norms fall into (but do not 
exhaust) the former camp; moral and social norms fall into the latter.25 BEGS contend that, 
while formal and non-formal norms can overlap, their operation differs across these con-
texts. Formal norms are accompanied by secondary rules that govern interpretation and 
enforcement, while non-formal norms lack these secondary rules. In other words, formal 
norms have an identifiable source, and that source (typically) has the authority to interpret 
and enforce the norm. Formal norms therefore create accountability relationships that are 
mediated through an external authority.26 The normative attitudes that attach to formal 
norms can concern either the act picked out under the normative principle, or the authority 
of an entity to interpret or enforce the norm, or both.27 By contrast, non-formal norms do 
not typically have a definitive origin or an authoritative interpreter. Rather, interpretation 
and enforcement are decentralized.28 Non-formal norms therefore generate an unmediated 
form of accountability because members of a group enforce them against each other. 
Among non-formal norms, BEGS distinguish moral norms from social norms, which differ 
based on the grounds on which the normative principles and attitudes are justified. Moral 
norms are grounded on judgments that are independent of social practices, while social 
norms are grounded (at least in part) by practice-dependent social attitudes.29 
In sum, four important features of the norms as normative attitudes view are that it 
is non-reductive (because it uses normative concepts to explain the normativity of norms); 
it cashes out norms in terms of the normative attitudes related to normative principles; it 
sees the core function of norms as fostering accountability; and it is capable of describing 
legal, moral, and social norms. 
                                                          
the non-philanthropic behavior of others, despite harboring non-philanthropic desires themselves). Id. at 31-32. 
 21. Id. at 35-36.  
 22. Id. at 35. 
 23. Id. at 36.  
 24. Id. at 37. 
 25. Id. at 40-41.   
 26. Id. at 52.  
 27. Id. at 46-47.   
 28. Id. at 53-55.  
 29. Id. at 58-59, 67-81.   
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B. Complying with norms 
In Part III of Explaining Norms, BEGS address issues related to complying with 
norms. 
1. What Do Norms Govern? 
Norms typically govern behavior. However, BEGS argue, norms can also “bear[] 
upon what goes on inside people’s heads”30 by “demand[ing] that we have or form certain 
attitudes and that we think or deliberate in certain ways.”31 In other words, BEGS claim 
that at least some norms are what we will call deliberation-sensitive; whether one lives up 
to these norms turns, at least in part, on how one deliberates. 
BEGS describe several ways that norms can be deliberation-sensitive. For example, 
if (as Joseph Raz contends) legal norms purport to provide exclusionary reasons, then they 
might be taken to demand that adherents exclude certain kinds of considerations from de-
liberation, to “think no further of them.”32 A norm could also govern deliberation by re-
moving some alternatives from the agenda of available options33 or “narrow[ing] the 
agenda down to a small number of alternatives.”34 Some norms forbid (and others require) 
“calculative reasoning,” or scrupulous thinking about the costs or benefits of a particular 
kind of decision.35 
BEGS contend that non-formal norms can impose deliberative requirements, while 
formal norms do not.36 According to BEGS, formal norms typically apply only to actions, 
and “there would be something very odd in the case of laws that make demands on our 
attitudes.”37 Although BEGS do not address this question directly, they also seem to con-
tend that formal norms are deliberation-insensitive. It is unclear whether BEGS see delib-
eration-insensitivity as a conceptual feature of formal norms or a contingent feature of 
Western legal systems. (BEGS contemplate the deliberation-insensitivity of formal norms 
only briefly in Chapter 3, and this topic is not mentioned in their more sustained discussion 
of norms and deliberation in Chapter 12.) By contrast, BEGS argue, moral and social 
norms seem capable of “involv[ing] a much richer set of objects,” including the reasons 
for which someone acts.38 
BEGS’s analysis of the deliberation-sensitivity of norms is intriguing, but incom-
plete and (in places) incorrect. It is incomplete because BEGS focus primarily on how 
norms might prohibit certain forms of deliberation. They do not extensively discuss the 
possibility that a norm could impose more direct requirements on how someone deliber-
ates—for example, by mandating that she attend (or attribute practical significance) to 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 193. 
 31. Id. at 245.  
 32. Id. at 250-51. This gloss on Raz’s position is inaccurate, since Raz denies that exclusionary reasons are 
“reason[s] to avoid thinking, considering or attending to certain matters,” or that they preclude an agent from 
engaging with excluded first-order considerations. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 184-85 
(1999).   
 33. NORMS, supra note 2, at 251.  
 34. Id. at 253.  
 35. Id. at 254-67.  
 36. Id. at 50.  
 37. Id. BEGS do not further elaborate why it would be odd for laws to make demands on deliberation.  
 38. Id. at 50-51.  
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certain kinds of considerations. Nor do BEGS explain when or why any norm might be 
deliberation-sensitive. It is incorrect because some formal norms are deliberation-sensi-
tive. As noted below,39 a variety of legal norms (including, notably, fiduciary duties) gov-
ern both behavior and deliberation. 
2. Modes of Compliance 
BEGS distinguish complying with a norm from breaching a norm (that is, behaving 
or deliberating contrary to its requirements).40 They also identify two different modes of 
complying with a norm: “following” and “conforming.” Someone follows a norm when 
she not only behaves (or deliberates) as the norm requires, but also justifies these actions 
by the fact that the norm requires them.41 Someone conforms to a norm when she behaves 
or deliberates as the norm requires, “not because of the norm, but because of other consid-
erations associated with the norm.”42 Let’s call the difference between these two modes of 
compliance the following/conforming distinction.43 
As the definition of these terms suggests, following is a more demanding modality 
than conforming. According to BEGS, following a norm requires “internalizing” it, or be-
coming disposed to “treat the norm as a non-instrumental reason” for action.44 For exam-
ple, take the norm to ordinarily keep one’s promise. If Ann behaves and deliberates exactly 
as this norm requires, but does so for reasons that do not essentially reference the norm 
(say, because her deity requires it), then she would not follow the norm of promise keeping. 
By contrast, to conform to a norm is to “externalize” it, or to treat it as providing a “purely 
instrumental reason to act in accordance.”45 Ann’s same patterns of deity-inspired behav-
ior and deliberation would count as conforming to the norm of promise keeping. Therefore, 
whether Ann complies with the norm of promise keeping depends on whether this norm 
must be followed, or if it can be satisfied through conformity. 
After drawing the following/conforming distinction, BEGS utilize a Humean picture 
of norm internalization46 to draw a number of stark conclusions. First, they contend that 
following formal norms is rare because internalizing legal norms is rare. People generally 
lack non-instrumental desires to act in accordance with legal norms and, in any event, these 
desires seldom explain why someone acts.47 BEGS also contend that following legal norms 
is irrational. Even if a considerable portion of citizens take the state to be justified in en-
forcing a law, it does not follow that anyone should have a non-instrumental desire to act 
in accordance with that law.48 Thus, people paradigmatically comply with legal norms by 
                                                          
 39. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.  
 40. NORMS, supra note 2, at 234.  
 41. Id. at 195.  
 42. Id. at 218.  
 43. This distinction parallels a similar distinction that Joseph Raz draws between complying with a norm and 
conforming to it. See RAZ, supra note 32, at 178; Scott Hershovitz, Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Author-
ity, 9 LEGAL THEORY 201, 202 (2003); DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 15 (2012); Ste-
phen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 LEGAL THEORY 106, 
111 (2014).   
 44. NORMS, supra note 2, at 219.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text and infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.   
 47. NORMS, supra note 2, at 210-12.  
 48. Id. at 211-13.  
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conforming to them,49 and this mode of response is “perfectly rational.”50 
Second, BEGS see following a moral norm as similarly rare and irrational. BEGS 
invite us to consider the moral norm against rape.51 To follow this norm is to refrain from 
rape and to justify this refraining because it is prohibited by the norm (rather than for other 
moral considerations, such as that rape degrades and harms the victim). Yet, on the norms 
as normative attitudes view, a principle is a moral norm in a society only if “a significant 
proportion of the members of the society possess norm-independent normative attitudes 
corresponding to the rule or principle.”52 If a substantial portion of a society followed a 
moral norm, then it would cease to be a moral norm because people would treat the norm 
itself (rather than the norm-independent normative attitudes that correspond to it) as justi-
fying the action.53 Therefore, BEGS conclude, conformity is the “paradigmatic mode” of 
complying with moral norms.54 
Third, BEGS conclude that some social norms are capable of being followed. Be-
cause social norms are non-formal, they implicate normative attitudes about the justifica-
tory force of the principles themselves, rather than attitudes about the justification of an 
entity’s authority to interpret or enforce the principles. Since the attitudes undergirding 
social norms are essentially practice-dependent, there is nothing irrational or self-defeating 
about following a social norm.55 However, BEGS argue, nearly every norm that is satisfied 
by following can also be satisfied by conformity: to judge that a principle is a social norm 
is to also take oneself to have instrumental reasons (e.g., reasons to avoid the disapproval 
of others) to act in accordance with it.56 
BEGS’s conclusions about the following/conforming distinction are questionable, 
and their arguments for them are problematic. Their case for the irrationality of following 
formal or moral norms stems from their Humean picture of internalization, on which some-
one internalizes a norm only if she develops “a non-instrumental desire to act in accord-
ance with [the] norm”—that is, a desire in which “part of the justification” for acting in 
accordance with a norm is “simply the norm itself.”57 The notion of a “non-instrumental 
desire to act in accordance with a norm” seems both mysterious and ad hoc. BEGS do not 
establish what such a desire is, whether non-instrumentality is a feature of a desire or part 
of its content, how non-instrumental desires differ from other conative states that are not 
required for internalization (such as “basic” desires),58 or how one develops or comes to 
have a non-instrumental desire. Yet BEGS treat the mysteriousness of non-instrumental 
desires not as an infelicity in their argument, but rather as support for their conclusion. In 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 213. 
 50. Id. at 229.  
 51. Id. at 214.  
 52. Id. at 215.  
 53. Id. at 230. 
 54. Id. at 215.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 232.  
 57. Id. at 201-02.  
 58. Id. at 201. BEGS suggest that the difference between non-instrumental and basic desires is that a non-
instrumental desire can appear to be basic, but might not in fact be. Id. at 202. Yet this argument appears to be at 
odds with what BEGS call the “grounds view” concerning the difference between moral and social norms, id. at 
58-59, since the grounds for non-instrumental and basic desires appear to be the same—namely, the agent’s belief 
that the desire is basic.  
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essence, they argue that it is implausible that anyone could develop non-instrumental de-
sires regarding a moral or legal norm, and so it would be irrational for anyone to ever 
follow such norms (and, by implication, implausible for any norm to call for following as 
its paradigmatic mode of compliance). 
There are several difficulties with this argument. First, BEGS never defend the 
Humean picture of internalizing a norm. Rather, they help themselves to it based on their 
(also undefended) choice to analyze norms through a rational choice framework.59 This 
dialectical move is problematic because, as BEGS acknowledge, the Humean picture of 
motivation is controversial.60 
Second, on an alternative (and, to our minds, more plausible) picture of what it is to 
internalize a norm, it is not so far-fetched to think that complying with a norm would 
require following it. For example, a more cognitivist picture might see someone’s inter-
nalization of a norm as equivalent to treating the norm “as reason-giving in one’s practical 
reasoning and planning concerning some relevant circumstances.”61 On such a cognitivist 
construal, internalization is both less mysterious and more routine. 
Third, and most directly, BEGS’s conclusions about the following/conforming dis-
tinction ring false. If BEGS’s arguments are sound, then there should not be situations 
where complying with a norm requires following it. Yet complying with certain norms 
seems to require following them. One breaches these norms by behaving and deliberating 
in the ways that these norms require, but doing so for inappropriate reasons. Some argue 
that following is the only way to comply with certain moral norms, such as norms regard-
ing the reparation of wrongdoing.62 In the legal domain, norms regarding public offices 




In sum, Explaining Norms offers a promising definition of what norms are. The 
“norms as normative attitudes” view sees norms as clusters of normative attitudes and non-
normative beliefs among a population. On this view, the core point of norms is to foster 
accountability among the members of a group. The norms as normative attitudes view does 
not explain norms entirely in terms of non-normative phenomena, and it generalizes to 
describe legal, moral, and social norms (although it also identifies important differences 
                                                          
 59. Id. at 198.  
 60. Id. at 22, 68; see also Mary Clayton Coleman, Directions of Fit and the Humean Theory of Motivation, 
86 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 127 (2008); Joshua May, Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do, 16 ETHICAL 
THEORY & MORAL PRACT. 791 (2013); R. JAY WALLACE, NORMATIVITY AND THE WILL: SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PRACTICAL REASON 15-42 (2006).  
 61. MICHAEL BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION 197 (1999); see also Ruth Chang, Commitments, Reasons, 
and the Will, in 8 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 74 (2013); Samuel Scheffler, Valuing, in REASONS AND 
RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.M. SCANLON (Samuel Freeman, Rahul Kumar, & R. Jay Wal-
lace eds., 2011).  
 62. See Margaret Urban Walker, The Expressive Burden of Reparations: Putting Meaning into Money, 
Words, and Things, in JUSTICE, RESPONSIBILITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WAKE OF CONFLICT 205-25 (Al-
ice MacLachlan & Allen Speight eds., 2013). More broadly, Richard Holton contends that the Knobe effect in 
experimental philosophy can be explained by the notion that intentionally conforming to a moral norm requires 
“be[ing] counterfactually guided by it.” Richard Holton, Norms and the Knobe Effect, 70 ANALYSIS 417, 418 
(2010). This counterfactual guidance resembles following a norm, at least on the more cognitivist understanding 
of that term described above.  
 63. See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.  
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among these kinds of norms). As we show in Part II, each of these features contrasts with 
“reductive behaviorism,” the predominant definition of norms among legal scholars. 
Explaining Norms also offers insight into two aspects of norm compliance. Some 
norms are deliberation-sensitive. Complying with these norms turns on what goes on in-
side someone’s head, and not merely how she behaves. Further, there is a difference be-
tween following a norm and merely conforming to it. Although we disagree with BEGS 
on which types of norms are deliberation-sensitive and how to draw the following/con-
forming distinction, both of these notions seem to be important aspects of the normative 
world. Yet, as we discuss in Part III, reductive behaviorism deems both of these notions 
to be either unintelligible or unimportant. 
II. REDUCTIVE BEHAVIORISM 
Among legal scholars, the predominant definition of norms is a position that we call 
“reductive behaviorism.”64 We first provide a synopsis of reductive behaviorism, then ex-
plain some of the methodological advantages of this definition, and finally examine the 
influence of this definition on two prominent legal scholars of norms. 
Reductive behaviorism starts from the rational choice framework that BEGS adopt. 
However, reductive behaviorism conflicts with each of the aspects of BEGS’s norms as 
normative attitudes view described above. First, reductive behaviorism is reductive be-
cause it explains the acceptance of a norm in terms of non-normative considerations.65 
Second, it is behaviorist because it sees regularities of behavior as the bedrock of what 
norms are.66 In BEGS’s terms, patterns of behavior determine whether a normative prin-
ciple has been accepted within a group. To be sure, not all who adopt reductive behavior-
ism see behavioral regularities as sufficient to establish a norm. Many theorists impose 
additional requirements, such as that the regularity be enforced through sanctions,67 that 
                                                          
 64. To be sure, not all legal scholars (or even legal economists) adopt a reductive behaviorist definition of 
norms. Robert Cooter’s extensive writings on norms are a prominent counterexample. See Robert D. Cooter, 
Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000); 
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the 
New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996). See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social 
Norms, 99 COLUM.  L.  REV. 1253 (1999); Brian Sheppard, Norm Supercompliance and the Status of Soft Law, 
62 BUFF. L. REV. 787 (2014); Rebecca Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the Internal Point of 
View (Aug. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
 65. NORMS, supra note 2, at 4.   
 66. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1573, 1576 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“All contributors to the [law and 
economics] literature seem to agree that a norm at least includes the element of a behavioral regularity in a group 
. . . .”) (hereinafter McAdams & Rasmusen, Norms and the Law); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1955, 1962-63 (2001) (norms are “commonly shared practices that people tend to pursue even though legal 
rules alone do not compel them to do so”); ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 126 (the term “[n]orm denotes both 
behavior that is normal, and behavior that people should mimic to avoid being punished.”) Not all views that 
reduce norms to non-normative phenomena construe behaviors to be bedrock. In other words, some reductionists 
are not behaviorists. See, e.g., Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ar-
chives/spr2011/entries/social-norms/ (“A norm cannot simply be identified with a recurrent, collective behav-
ioral pattern.”).   
 67. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of 
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1812 (2008) 
(“To be a norm rather than a mere behavioral regularity, the rule . . . must be enforced; that is, violations must 
be punished.”); Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 389, 414 (2007) (norms are 
“behavioral regularities enforced either externally, by a community, or internally, or both”); Ernst Fehr & Simon 
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/8
2015] NORMS, ATTITUDES, AND COMPLIANCE 623 
deviations from the regularity generate disapproval,68 or that the regularity be internalized 
by a wide swath of a population.69 However, reductive behaviorism implies that, because 
norms are (at least) clusters of behavior, complying with a norm is a matter of behaving in 
a particular way.70 Third, the core function of norms is to resolve coordination or cooper-
ation problems.71 Fourth, reductive behaviorism explains social norms only, and is not 
claimed to explain either moral or legal norms.72 
Reductive behaviorism has several analytic advantages. It allows researchers to cre-
ate testable hypotheses concerning how people behave, and so is (in theory) capable of 
describing how norms operate in a variety of real-world contexts.73 Where manipulations 
of the salience of a norm are associated with changes in behavior, reductive behaviorism 
supports the inference that the former caused the latter.74 Moreover, if norms are regulari-
ties of behavior, then they can be identified inductively through examining the patterns of 
behavior in a particular society.75 This capacity to infer the content of norms is particularly 
advantageous in settings where a researcher cannot survey members of a normative com-
munity directly or where members are unlikely to have conscious access to the content of 
a norm. 
Although many legal scholars accept reductive behaviorism uncritically or as part 
of disciplinary assumptions from economics, some offer a more sustained argument for 
                                                          
Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14  J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 166 (2000) (a social 
norm is “a behavioral regularity[] that is . . . based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave [and] 
which triggers . . . the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal social sanctions.”); Alex C. Geisinger, 
A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 608 (2004) (defining a norm 
as “a behavioral rule supported by a pattern of informal sanctions”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in 
Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1234 
n.11 (2000) (norms are “patterns of behavior that are widely adhered to by some group of individuals, at least in 
part because of social pressures to conform to that norm. . . . Norms can be distinguished from other forms of 
human behavior that are widely adhered to for reasons having nothing to do with social pressures.”).  
 68. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 
357 (1997) (hereinafter McAdams, Origin).  
 69. See, e.g., Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and Signals: An Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of 
Social Norms, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5, 13 (2011) (“[A] norm is . . . a pattern of behavior that has been commonly 
internalized to some degree or another, generating a sense of implicit obligation.”); Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible 
Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 641 (2010) (“Social norms, of 
course, are grounded in the collective practice of some regularity of behavior. Such a regularity becomes a norm, 
in turn, where it is followed with some sense of obligation.”).  
 70. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 24 (2000) (“[S]ocial norms are always about ob-
served behavior.”).  
 71. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003).  
 72. See, e.g., McAdams & Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, supra note 66, at 1577; POSNER, supra note 70, 
at 25.  
 73. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 70, at 36-38; Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law 
and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000).  
 74. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1408 (2011) (cit-
ing P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms, 18 
PSYCH. SCI. 429, 432-33 (2007)). 
 75. Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV 973, 993 (2000) (describing Eric Posner’s view as “a shift away from 
a deductive model of social norms in the direction of empirically grounded explanations”); Michael P. Vanden-
bergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1101, 1114 (2005) (advocating an “inductive approach that tailors norms theory to specific clusters of 
behaviors and periods of time, and allows for rigorous testing of its predictive capacity for these behaviors and 
time periods”).   
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this definition. One example is Eric Posner, whose “signaling theory” aims to describe the 
social function that norms serve. According to Posner, social norms provide an avenue for 
someone to signal to others what type of person he is. Acting in accordance with a norm 
indicates that he is likely to be cooperative, while non-conforming behavior indicates that 
he is likely to be an opportunist.76 In order to facilitate this signaling, norms must impose 
costly requirements on those who follow them or those who punish defections (or both) 
and apply to “appearance and observable behaviors” that are arbitrary (that is, ones that do 
not come pre-equipped with a salience that would indicate prospective cooperativeness or 
opportunism).77 Posner defines social norms as “the behavioral regularities that occur in 
equilibrium when people use signals to show that they belong to the good type.”78 Posner 
sees a necessarily tight connection between the signaling function of norms and the reduc-
tive definition of norms as behavioral regularities—if norms were not patterns of observ-
able behaviors, then people could not use them to signal their status as cooperators through 
obedience or defiance. 
Richard McAdams’s “esteem theory” also rests on a reductive, behaviorist definition 
of norms. Like Posner, McAdams’s primary ambition is to explain how norms originate 
and why people behave in accordance with them. McAdams starts from the assumption 
that everyone has a preference for esteem—that is, a desire for others to think well or not 
think badly of her.79 If there is a consensus about whether “some behavior X” is esteem-
worthy or not, and there is some inherent risk that others will detect whether someone X’s, 
and the existence of this consensus and this risk are well-known, then a norm regarding 
X-ing can arise if both “the consensus is that X deserves esteem” and “if the esteem ben-
efits exceed, for most people, the costs of engaging in X.” Likewise, “if the consensus 
condemns X, a norm will arise if, for most people, the esteem costs exceed the benefits of 
engaging in X.”80 Esteem-based sanctions can, in turn, sustain a norm if there is a wide-
spread practice of esteeming those who do X and disesteeming those who do not do X.81 
McAdams sees the esteem theory as consistent with the notion that norms are “be-
havioral regularities supported at least in part by normative attitudes.”82 On this definition, 
a norm is a pattern of behavior that is generally exhibited by individuals in a population; 
for which conformity is approved and/or nonconformity is disapproved; and for which 
these patterns of approval and disapproval “help[] to ensure” (in the sense of being caus-
ally implicated in) the existence of the regularity.83 In other words, the normative attitudes 
serve as “normative incentives,” or internal and external sanctions that influence behavior 
                                                          
 76. POSNER, supra note 70, at 18.  
 77. Id. at 22.  
 78. Id. at 34.  
 79. McAdams, Origin, supra note 68, at 356-58.  
 80. Id. at 358.  
 81. Id. at 372-73 (describing a “secondary consensus” concerning condoning of norm violations that arises if 
“there is some risk that one’s condoning of norm violators will be discovered without others bearing monitoring 
costs,” and “this risk and the secondary consensus are sufficiently well known”).  
 82. McAdams & Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, supra note 66, at 1576. 
 83. Richard H. McAdams, Conventions and Norms: Philosophical Aspects in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2735, 2739 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). These latter two 
elements distinguish norms from conventions. Id. at 2739; McAdams & Rasmussen, Norms and the Law, supra 
note 66, at 1576. According to McAdams, a behavioral regularity for which normative attitudes are not present 
or play no causal role in its persistence is a convention, rather than a norm.  
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in relation to a norm.84 On the esteem theory, the relevant normative attitudes or incentives 
concern esteem—that is, the desire to have others think well and not think badly of oneself, 
which is an instance of the broader desire for “respect or prestige.”85 
At first glance, the esteem theory does not appear to utilize a reductive definition of 
norms. McAdams defines norms utilizing both a non-normative element (i.e., behavioral 
regularities) and a normative element (i.e., normative attitudes). This definition of norms 
would not seem to be reductive (in the sense that BEGS use that term) because it does not 
characterize the facticity of norms in “purely non-normative terms.”86 However, despite 
McAdams’s description of his view as non-reductive,87 we think that the esteem theory 
utilizes a reductive definition of norms for the reasons discussed in the following foot-
note.88 
Regardless of whether it is purely reductive, the esteem theory clearly sees behav-
ioral regularities as the bedrock of a norm. As McAdams notes, the normative attitudes 
related to esteem matter not in their own right, but only insofar as they sustain behavioral 
regularities.89 Moreover, the esteem theory supposes that complying with a norm is en-
tirely a matter of observable behavior, since only such behaviors would invite the “inherent 
risk of detection” that McAdams sees as a precondition for a norm’s stability over time.90 
While Posner’s signaling theory and McAdams’s esteem theory differ on several 
key issues, both views presuppose a reductively behaviorist definition of norms. Posner 
clearly conceives of norms in entirely non-normative terms, and McAdams arguably does 
                                                          
 84. McAdams & Rasmussen, Norms and the Law, supra note 66, at 1578.  
 85. McAdams, Origin, supra note 68, at 342.  
 86. NORMS, supra note 2, at 15.  
 87. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 
YALE L. J. 625, 681-87 (2001).  
 88. There are at least two reasons to think the esteem theory utilizes a reductive (in BEGS’s sense) definition 
of norms. First, attitudes regarding esteem (and the broader attitudes regarding “respect” and “prestige” of which 
they are a subset) are not necessarily normative attitudes. For example, Stephen Darwall argues that esteem does 
not have the second-personal structure characteristic of normative attitudes—it can be warranted by its object, 
but it cannot be demanded. STEPHEN L. DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 120-22 (2006); see also 
R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 131-32 (1994) (noting that states of emotions 
like esteem do not essentially implicate moral concepts because they “are not the sorts of states that can directly 
be controlled by the reasons expressed in moral principles”). These classificatory arguments have intuitive force. 
Many judgments of esteem do not implicate normative appraisals whatsoever—it seems routine to think well of 
someone (for example, because she has clear skin) without judging that she acted in the way that she ought to 
have acted. DARWALL, supra, at 122. Further, the judgment that someone acted (or did not act) in the way that 
she ought to have acted routinely has no effect on our relative esteem of her. If esteem is not an essentially 
normative attitude, then the esteem theory utilizes a reductive definition of norms because it defines norms in 
terms of two non-normative phenomena—behaviors and non-normative attitudes related to esteem.  
  A second reason to think that the esteem theory utilizes a reductive definition of norms is that McAdams 
does not attribute an essential role to the esteem-based attitudes in supporting behavioral regularities. Rather, it 
is the (non-normative) desires to obtain the esteem of others that sustain the regularities. See McAdams, Origin, 
supra note 68, at 342; McAdams & Rasmussen, Norms and the Law, supra note 66, at 1588. These desires might 
reference normative attitudes of others, but they are not essentially normative concepts. (Recall that, on BEGS’s 
typology, accounts that construe norms in terms of desires are reductionist. NORMS, supra note 2, at 22.) Thus, 
the best characterization of McAdams’s position is that norms are behavioral regularities sustained by an essen-
tially non-normative desire for respect or prestige. If this interpretation is correct, then the esteem theory utilizes 
a reductive definition of norms because it explains the facticity of norms in terms of two non-normative phenom-
ena—namely, patterns of behavior and non-normative desires.  
 89. McAdams, Origin, supra note 68, at 381.  
 90. Id. at 361; see also Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725, 743-
44 (1990) (describing publicity assumption of norms).  
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too. Both theories see behaviors as the bedrock of norms. Both see the core function of 
norms as resolving coordination and cooperation problems, although each theory con-
ceives of these problems somewhat differently.91 Finally, both theories aim to describe 
social norms, rather than norms generally.92 Moreover, aside from some prominent excep-
tions,93 most legal scholars of norms accept each of the main tenets of reductive behavior-
ism. 
III. WHAT REDUCTIVE BEHAVIORISM MISSES 
Reductive behaviorism is an inadequate definition of norms. More importantly, it 
does not and cannot meet the goal of describing how norms work. Reductive behaviorism 
is committed to denying that norms could ever be deliberation-sensitive and that there 
could be any meaningful difference between following and conforming to a norm. Yet, as 
BEGS contend in Explaining Norms and we elaborate in this part, some norms are delib-
eration-sensitive and there is sometimes a meaningful difference between conforming to a 
norm and following it. The reductive behaviorist is doomed to miss these important aspects 
of the normative world. 
A. Reductive behaviorism cannot explain deliberation-sensitive norms 
According to reductive behaviorism, complying with norms is entirely a matter of 
behavior.94 How someone deliberates in relation to a norm does not matter directly, alt-
hough it might matter indirectly insofar as someone’s deliberation predicts her behavior. 
Thus, reductive behaviorism is logically committed to denying the deliberation-sensitivity 
of norms. If compliance with a norm turned on how one deliberated, then reductive behav-
iorism would be incorrect because behavior would not be the bedrock of a norm. 
As noted above, BEGS contend that some norms are deliberation-sensitive in that 
they impose requirements on how deliberation should proceed.95 If some norms are delib-
eration-sensitive, then reductive behaviorism reaches incorrect conclusions about what 
counts as complying with these norms. To illustrate this difficulty, consider the following 
example. 
 
Lucky Dentist: Dylan is a dentist who is scheduled to extract the right 
maxillary first premolar from his patient, Pete. To break up the monot-
ony of his surgical life, Dylan will count the number of syllables in the 
first sentence that his assistant says to him and extract the tooth that cor-
responds (under the universal system of notation) with that number. 
Dylan’s assistant says “How’s it going, boss?”, which has five syllables. 
Dylan commits to extracting the tooth that corresponds to the number 
five, which is the right maxillary first premolar. Dylan then extracts 
                                                          
 91. POSNER, supra note 70, at ch. 1; McAdams & Rasmussen, Norms and the Law, supra note 66, at 1586-
88.  
 92. POSNER, supra note 70, at 46; McAdams & Rasmussen, Norms and the Law, supra note 66, at 1577.  
 93. See supra note 64.  
 94. See supra note 66.   
 95. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.    
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Pete’s right maxillary first premolar. 
 
Does Dylan live up to the norms for dentists? We think not. Yet this verdict can’t be 
explained by Dylan’s observable behavior: Dylan extracts Pete’s right maxillary first pre-
molar, which is what the norms for dentists would seem to require.96 Rather, the problem 
is with Dylan’s deliberation. Complying with the norms for dentists requires the interests 
of the patient to figure into the dentist’s practical deliberation in certain ways. Yet Pete’s 
interests do not figure into Dylan’s decision about what to do. In determining which of 
Pete’s teeth to extract, what matters to Dylan is the number of syllables in his assistant’s 
sentence, not which tooth’s extraction would most help Pete. It is an accident that Dylan’s 
behavior winds up serving Pete’s best interests. 
Reductive behaviorism gets the wrong answer in the Lucky Dentist case. The reduc-
tive behaviorist seemingly must embrace the conclusion that Dylan complies with the 
norms for dentists because, in extracting Pete’s right maxillary first premolar, he behaves 
in way that these norms require. The problem is not merely that some versions of reductive 
behaviorism seem to reach the wrong verdict in this case. Rather, every version of reduc-
tive behaviorism necessarily reaches the incorrect verdict because of the commitment to 
define norms as behavioral regularities. If behavioral regularities are the bedrock of norms, 
then the normative principles contained in norms can only govern behaviors.97 
The Lucky Dentist case suggests that some non-formal norms (like the norms for 
dentists) govern both behavior and deliberation. However, contrary to BEGS’s claim that 
formal norms are deliberation-insensitive,98 some legal norms also impose requirements 
on deliberation. 
Fiduciary duties are a clear example of such deliberation-sensitive formal norms. 
Fiduciary duties arise out of fiduciary relationships like those between attorneys and cli-
ents, corporate board members and shareholders, or trustees and beneficiaries.99 Fiduciary 
duties are typically taken to include at least a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.100 Both of 
these component duties can be formulated to concern behavior: the duty of care is often 
taken to be satisfied when the fiduciary behaves in the way that a prudent or diligent agent 
would,101 and some see the duty of loyalty as satisfied when the fiduciary behaves in ac-
cordance with the “no conflict” rule (which prohibits “acting with a conflict . . . [of] inter-
                                                          
 96. For example, Dylan’s behavior does not obviously run afoul of the American Dental Association’s Prin-
ciples of Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct. Dylan does not violate the principle of nonmaleficence be-
cause he does not harm Pete. ADA Code, § 2. Dylan’s actions also seem consistent with the principle of benefi-
cence because his behavior has the effect of promoting Pete’s welfare. Id. §3. 
 97. By contrast, an account that did not see behavioral regularities as the bedrock of norms could make sense 
of the idea that a norm would regulate something other than behavior. For example, on the norms as normative 
attitudes view that BEGS advance, a norm could regulate deliberation if the normative principle contained in the 
norm calls for deliberating in a certain way, and the principle-corresponding normative attitudes would attach if 
someone did not deliberate in the way that the principle required.  
 98. NORMS, supra note 2, at 50-51.  
 99. Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, in 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 286 (1989).  
 100. Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 105-06 (2008).   
 101. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 169 (2011) (“The duty of care requires fiduciaries to execute their 
services, and execute them well.”).   
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est”) and the “no profit” rule (which prohibits “making a profit [off] [] the fiduciary posi-
tion”).102 
In addition to these behavioral requirements, fiduciary duties also seem to impose 
deliberative requirements. In some contexts, the duty of care is explicitly formulated in a 
way that imposes requirements on how a fiduciary deliberates. On such a construal, the 
“duty of care” amounts to a duty to be careful. For example, the norms governing the 
professional conduct of attorneys require not just that an attorney’s course of action “ad-
vance a client’s lawful objectives,” but also that it be “reasonably calculated” to do so.103 
By implication, a course of action that happened to advance the client’s lawful objectives 
but was not reasonably calculated to do so would run afoul of this standard. Furthermore, 
many scholars construe the duty of loyalty to impose deliberative requirements on fiduci-
aries.104 According to these scholars, a fiduciary does not satisfy her duty of loyalty unless 
the interests or ends of the principal play a specific role in her deliberation about what to 
do. 
Of course, someone attracted to reductive behaviorism about norms might also be 
attracted to the view (popular among law and economics scholars) that fiduciary duties are 
fully explicable in terms of behavior.105 However, behaviorism about fiduciary duties gen-
erates absurd conclusions that parallel those in the Lucky Dentist case. For example, be-
haviorism about fiduciary duties would imply that a corporate director could satisfy her 
duty of loyalty by choosing a course of action on a whim (that is, without any consideration 
of the merits of the decision), so long as this course of action is the one that she would 
have chosen if she had deliberated properly.106 
We do not mean to suggest that all (or even most) legal or social norms are deliber-
ation-sensitive,107 nor to deny that most deliberation-sensitive norms also impose behav-
ioral requirements. Indeed, there is good reason to think that few legal norms will be de-
liberation-sensitive. As BEGS note, legal norms are policed through institutions in a way 
that social and moral norms are not.108 It is difficult to police deliberation-sensitive norms 
because it is difficult to determine how someone has deliberated. By contrast, it is much 
easier to establish when someone has behaved in a particular way. These epistemic chal-
lenges to policing deliberation might explain why deliberation-sensitive legal norms are 
rare, but they do not support the more ambitious claim (entailed by reductive behaviorism) 
that deliberation-sensitive legal norms cannot exist.109 
                                                          
 102. Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 LAW Q. REV. 452, 459-60 (2005).  
 103. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §16(1) (2000).  
 104. See, e.g., Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY, AND TRUSTS: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003); Laby, supra note 100; Galoob & Leib, supra 
note 43.  
 105. See generally, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 
425 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 899 (2011).   
 106. Cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (2003) (stating that a fiduciary duty would 
be violated if corporate directors “consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities” by “adopting 
a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision”).  
 107. On the other hand, there is considerable disagreement among philosophers about whether moral norms 
are necessarily (or ever) deliberation-sensitive. See S. Matthew Liao, Intentions and Moral Permissibility: The 
Case of Acting Permissibly with Bad Intentions, 31 LAW & PHIL. 703 (2012).  
 108. NORMS, supra note 2, at 43-46.  
 109. The deliberation-sensitivity of norms is worthy of future study. It seems possible that groups could cus-
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In sum, some social norms are deliberation-sensitive. Complying with these norms 
requires both behaving and deliberating in specific ways. Moreover, the example of fidu-
ciary duties indicates that, pace BEGS, some legal norms are deliberation-sensitive. One 
can violate a fiduciary duty when she deliberates in a particular way (or fails to), even if 
she otherwise behaves in the way that a careful and loyal person would behave. Reductive 
behaviorism cannot explain the existence of deliberation-sensitive norms; indeed, it sees 
the possibility of such norms as paradoxical. Thus, reductive behaviorism obscures part of 
the normative world. 
B. Reductive behaviorism cannot explain the following/conforming distinction. 
Reductive behaviorism also cannot make sense of the difference between conform-
ing to and following a norm. Recall that, on BEGS’s definition, one follows a norm by 
acting in the way that the norm requires and because the norm requires it. By contrast, one 
conforms to a norm when she acts in the way that the norm requires while taking the norm 
to be an instrumental reason for action.110 The reductive behaviorist would be skeptical 
that following could ever be the requisite mode of responding to a norm. To be sure, many 
legal scholars (including some committed to reductive behaviorism) devote significant at-
tention to the question of how people do and might internalize norms.111 On reductive 
behaviorism, however, internalization only matters insofar as it generates or supports reg-
ularities in behavior. Norms that are internalized by a population are more likely to gener-
ate and sustain these regularities than norms that are not internalized. Thus, at the macro 
level, internalization might be useful to ensure the stability of norms, but it does not matter 
in its own right. One need not internalize any norm in order to comply with it.112 
This skepticism is unwarranted. Complying with some norms requires following 
them. Our contention here runs contrary to both reductive behaviorism and the conclusions 
of BEGS, who deny that any moral or legal norms must (or even could) be widely followed 
and see conformity with social norms to be as good as following them.113 In short, BEGS 
draw the following/complying distinction in the wrong place, and the reductive behaviorist 
cannot appreciate the importance of this distinction at all. 
Under what conditions would a norm call for following as the paradigmatic or req-
uisite mode of compliance? Assume that one can internalize a norm by taking it to provide 
                                                          
tomize the deliberation-sensitivity norms. To put this point in BEGS’s terms, a norm embodying the same nor-
mative principle might be deliberation-sensitive in one group and deliberation-insensitive in another group. Like-
wise, the degree to which a norm is deliberation-sensitive might vary among groups. We conjecture that deliber-
ation-sensitivity reflects a broader concern with what might be called “non-accidentalness,” which is in turn a 
way to elevate or reflect the importance of a normative principle within a group.  
 110. NORMS, supra note 2, at 195.  
 111. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 64; Yuval Feldman & Robert J. MacCoun, Some Well-Aged Wines for the 
“New Norms” Bottles: Implications of Social Psychology for Law and Economics, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francisco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution 
of Social Norms: A Perspective From the Legal Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter 
Opp eds., 2001); Richard H. McAdams, Resentment, Excuse, and Norms, in THE HART-FULLER DEBATE IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 249, 253-54 (Peter Cane ed., 2010).   
 112. For example, McAdams contends that both a sense of obligation and concern for esteem provide adequate 
incentives to comply with a norm. Id. at 256-57; Richard H. McAdams, Conformity to Inegalitarian Conventions 
and Norms: The Contribution of Coordination and Esteem, 88 THE MONIST 238, 251-52 (2005).  
 113. See NORMS, supra note 2, at 195.  
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a non-instrumental reason to act in accordance with the norm.114 This notion of internali-
zation requires a certain conscientiousness regarding the norm. Someone who justifies her 
actions based on first-order considerations without taking the norm itself to have practical 
significance would fail to internalize (and, by extension, would not follow) the norm. 
It strikes us that complying with many social norms requires this kind of conscien-
tiousness. If so, then following these norms is the paradigmatic mode of complying with 
them. For example, take the norm of spousal fidelity.115 This norm has an obvious behav-
ioral component: to be faithful, one must, inter alia, avoid engaging in sexual behavior 
with people who are not one’s spouse. Suppose that Ann behaves in the way that the norm 
of spousal fidelity requires, but sees this norm as providing merely instrumental reasons 
for action. Ann is disposed to engage in dalliances with those other than her spouse, but 
believes that she should avoid this behavior because, if detected, it would invite unwel-
come disapprobation from others. In many communities, it might be judged that Ann fails 
to comply with the norm of spousal fidelity. If so, then in these communities complying 
with the norm of spousal fidelity would require following it. 
Some legal norms, in particular norms related to public offices, also call for follow-
ing. Many public offices require their inhabitants to have or maintain higher-order com-
mitments regarding the offices themselves and the systems within which the offices oper-
ate. Someone can fail to comply with the norms of these public offices when she lacks 
these commitments, even when her behavior and deliberation otherwise mirror that of a 
committed office-holder. 
To illustrate this phenomenon, consider an example based on the television series 
The Americans.116 As background, The Americans is set during the waning days of the 
Cold War in the early 1980s. Philip and Elizabeth Jennings appear to be an attractive mar-
ried couple living in a suburb of Washington, D.C. However, Philip and Elizabeth are elite 
Soviet spies who have operated under deep cover in the United States since the late 1960s. 
The external trappings of Philip’s and Elizabeth’s lives are an artifice that allows them to 
pursue their true mission. Against this backdrop, consider the following scenario. 
 
Undercover Judge: As part of a KGB plot, Elizabeth undertakes a legal 
education and has a successful legal career. After several years of dis-
tinguished practice, she is appointed as a federal judge. The KGB ap-
proves this appointment in order to allow Elizabeth to use her judicial 
discretion to subtly subvert the American legal system from within 
whenever possible. In order to instruct Elizabeth on how to decide the 
cases before her and to evade detection, the KGB (unbeknownst to Eliz-
abeth) kidnaps another judge. The kidnapped judge is forced to review 
the pleadings and transcripts of oral arguments in all cases before Eliz-
abeth, as well as to write the legal opinions that he would write if he 
                                                          
 114. As would be consistent with the cognitivist picture of internalization described supra, at note 61. As noted 
above, this standard of internalization is less demanding than the Humean standard that BEGS posit, on which 
internalizing a norm requires forming non-derivative desires regarding the norm. NORMS, supra note 2, at 201-
02.  
 115. David Shoemaker, On Criminal and Moral Responsibility, in 3 OXFORD STUDIES IN NORMATIVE ETHICS 
154, 173 (Mark Timmons ed., 2014). 
 116. The Americans (FX Television Broadcast, 2013).   
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were the judge in these matters. These opinions are then transmitted to 
Elizabeth through her KGB handlers. Elizabeth then promulgates these 
opinions as if she had written them. 
 
Assume that the norms for judges are codified by the American Bar Association’s 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.117 The Model Code consists of both canons, or “over-
arching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe,”118 and specific rules 
(derived from each canon) that govern the actions of judges. Canon 1 states that a judge 
must “uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, 
and . . . avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”119 Canon 2 states that a 
judge must “perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and dili-
gently.”120 Some of the rules based on Canon 2 impose deliberative requirements. For ex-
ample, Rule 2.2 says that a judge must “uphold and apply the law” and “perform all duties 
of judicial office fairly and impartially.”121 Impartiality, in turn, requires the judge to be 
“objective and open-minded.”122 Other rules impose behavioral requirements. For exam-
ple, Rule 2.5 establishes that competence and diligence “requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge’s responsi-
bilities of judicial office.”123 
In Undercover Judge, does Elizabeth comply with the norms for judges?124 We think 
not. Elizabeth conforms to these norms because her behavior and deliberation meet the 
standard of Canon 2. Every ruling Elizabeth makes is one that a competent judge would 
make. Every opinion she promulgates is both based on the relevant legal materials and 
identical to what a competent judge would write. However, Elizabeth does not follow the 
norms for judges. Regardless of whether Elizabeth’s actions have the tendency to promote 
the “independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary,” she does not uphold these 
values, as Canon 1 requires. Another way to state the problem is that Elizabeth lacks a 
higher-order commitment to the legal system that judges must have in order to comply 
with the norms for judges. Elizabeth treats the norms for judges as providing purely in-
strumental reasons for her to act: her pattern of behavior and deliberation is consistent with 
the norms, but she behaves and deliberates in this way in order to evade detection and 
                                                          
 117. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007). The Model Code would meet BEGS’s definition of a formal 
norm, since it is promulgated by an identifiable source (the American Bar Association) that is taken to have the 
authority to interpret and revise these norms.  
 118. Id. at Scope ¶ 2.  
 119. Id. at Canon 1.  
 120. Id. at Canon 2.  
 121. Id. at Rule 2.2.  
 122. Id. at Rule 2.2, cmt. 1. 
 123. MODEL CODE, Rule 2.5, cmt. 1. 
 124. Whether Elizabeth complies with the norms for judges differs from whether her opinions are law, or 
whether a system in which a significant portion of officials took Elizabeth’s position would be a legal system at 
all. These latter two questions are debated by jurisprudential scholars grappling with H.L.A. Hart’s contention 
that judges and other officials in a legal system must take the “internal point of view” regarding fundamental 
norms. Compare H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (2d ed. 1997); Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal 
Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006); Christopher Kutz, The Judicial Community, 35 NOÛS 442 
(2001); with Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism, 36 AUSTRALIAN J. 
LEGAL PHIL. 89 (2011). In saying that Elizabeth does not comply with the norms of judging in Undercover Judge, 
we take no stance on whether her decisions are law.  
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further the interests of her Soviet principals. Elizabeth is not committed to these broader 
values, and so she does not uphold them. This lack of commitment explains why Elizabeth 
breaches the norms for judges. 
Reductive behaviorism reaches a different conclusion in the Undercover Judge case. 
If norms are clusters of behaviors, then complying with a norm cannot require anything 
more than behaving in accordance with the norm. Because Elizabeth behaves in exactly 
the ways that the norms for judges require, the reductive behaviorist must conclude that 
she complies with these norms. This conclusion is both intuitively implausible and incon-
sistent with the Model Code. Therefore, reductive behaviorism does not (and cannot) de-
scribe what it would take to comply with the norms for judges. 
BEGS also might contend that Elizabeth has complied with the norms for judges in 
Undercover Judge, although the norms as normative attitudes view does not bind them to 
this conclusion.125 The norms for judges are formal norms, and BEGS contend that fol-
lowing cannot be the paradigmatic mode of complying with formal norms. This conclusion 
is both intuitively implausible and in tension with the Model Code. 
BEGS might respond by arguing that the Undercover Judge case proves too much. 
On BEGS’s definition of internalization, it is arguable that any judge who acts in order to 
uphold some purpose broader than the norms for judging would fail to follow these norms. 
Yet not every judge who acts with a broader purpose would seem to breach the norms for 
judging in the way that Elizabeth does. For example, a judge who made his decisions in 
order to promote the American way of life would, on BEGS’s definition, fail to internalize 
the norms for judges because he would treat these norms as instrumentally important (that 
is, important insofar as they tend to promote the American way of life). Because one must 
internalize a norm in order to follow it, such a judge would not follow the norms for judges. 
Yet, intuitively, such a judge would not seem to violate the norms for judges. 
This response rests on BEGS’s Humean account of internalizing a norm, which we 
take issue with above.126 In addition, the notion of internalization in this imagined response 
seems too narrow. One could seemingly internalize a norm not only by taking the norm 
itself to be a reason for action, but also by taking a broader principle (into which the prin-
ciples contained in the norm figure inextricably) to be a reason for action. If so, then the 
judge who is committed to the American way of life would count as internalizing the norm 
for judges to the extent that he saw these norms as integral to the American way of life. 
To be sure, norm following is a tricky topic. Norms for which following is the par-
adigmatic or requisite mode of compliance should be rare. However, while BEGS would 
explain this rarity in terms of the irrationality of following a legal norm, we think that there 
is a more straightforward explanation in terms of political liberalism. It is difficult to de-
termine when someone has followed a particular norm. If a significant portion of legal 
norms required following, then the question of whether someone had complied with a legal 
norm would routinely remain unresolved. This would violate a number of liberal principles 
of legality that govern the enforcement of legal norms, including the requirements that the 
                                                          
 125. On the norms as normative attitudes view, a norm could require following if the normative principle 
contained in the norm included a self-reference, and if the principle-corresponding normative attitudes that con-
stituted the norm attached to efforts that did not satisfy this self-referential requirement.  
 126. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.  
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law be public and stable.127 
Moreover, we conjecture that, where a norm calls for following, a wide variety of 
mental states will likely suffice.128 In the Undercover Judge case, the commitments that 
Elizabeth lacks seemed just as problematic as the ones that she has. Thus, a broad range 
of intentional stances seem compatible with someone’s following the norms of an institu-
tional role. However, some commitments are bedrock. One who lacks these bedrock com-
mitments does not live up to the norms of that role. 
It might be argued that we have based a broad conclusion about norm following on 
a stylized example. Here is a positive claim that strikes us as plausible, but for which space 
constraints preclude an adequate defense: following is likely to be the requisite mode of 
complying with a norm whenever it is meaningful to criticize someone for acting in bad 
faith with regard to that norm. This conjecture reconciles the analysis of norm following 
with the earlier discussion of the deliberation-sensitivity of certain norms. When it is pos-
sible to criticize someone for acting in bad faith, a norm probably has some deliberation 
sensitivity. Therefore, deliberation-sensitive norms are the norms that are most likely to 
call for following. In these cases, the requirement that someone follow the norm is a way 
of ensuring the appropriate connection between her deliberation and her behavior. Dylan’s 
actions in Lucky Dentist and Elizabeth’s actions in Undercover Judge are both arguably 
examples of bad faith, and both cases also seem to involve inappropriate patterns of delib-
eration. This intertwining of deliberation-sensitivity and norm following is also captured 
by recent attempts to apply fiduciary concepts to judges and other public officials.129 The 
agent’s discretionary authority and capacity for self-dealing, coupled with the difficulties 
of the monitoring how the agent exercises this authority, lead to worries about how the 
agent behaves, how she deliberates, and why she decides to behave and deliberate in the 
ways that she does.130 However, reductive behaviorism rules out in advance the possibility 
that bad faith could matter in connection with any norm. Thus, reductive behaviorism oc-
cludes how at least some norms operate. 
CONCLUSION 
BEGS’s insights about the nature of norms and compliance are revelatory, even 
though we disagree with some of the conclusions that they reach. Explaining Norms should 
prompt greater attention to foundational issues in the study of norms by legal scholars. 
Some norms seem to govern behavior and deliberation, and some seem to only concern 
behavior. It also strikes us (although not BEGS) as an open question which norms must be 
                                                          
 127. Cf. Adam Hill, Stability, Assurance, and the Concept of Legal Guidance, LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming, 
2015), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10982-014-9204-y.  
 128. Similarly, Scott Shapiro reads Hart’s notion of the “internal point of view” that must be taken by a critical 
mass of legal officials to be capacious enough to include a wide variety of mental states, so long as these officials 
“accept the shared master plan of the system.” SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 97, 204-05 (2011). See also MARK 
BEVIR, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 267 (2010) (“An interpretive social science based on recognition of local 
reasoning typically leads to decentering, where to decenter is to analyze a practice in terms of the disparate beliefs 
of the actors. . . . Decentering . . . consists in showing how an apparently monolithic institution actually embodies 
diverse, contested webs of belief informed by different traditions.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Ethan Leib, David Ponet, & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CAL. L. REV. 
699 (2012); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary 
Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013).   
 130. EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 107-08 (2011).   
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followed and which can be satisfied through conformity. But these are questions worth 
asking. Reductive behaviorism denies that these questions are even intelligible, let alone 
interesting. Thus, this position is unsound. 
Why should a legal scholar (or anyone else) care about conceptual soundness? As 
Gerald Gaus has noted, a theory of norm-guided activity can be powerful even if it defines 
norms in a way that “does not perfectly track applications of the term ‘norm.’”131 This 
position is wise—unsoundness matters much more in the seminar room than in doing field 
research or making policy. However, not all conceptual flaws are easily dismissed. Reduc-
tive behaviorism is imperfect in a way that leads to an inadequate description of what it is 
to live under and comply with norms. Nor is this imperfection inevitable, as several legal 
scholars have appreciated the significance of (and attempted to model) the cognitive di-
mensions of norms.132 A theory that reduces all norms to behaviors is foreordained to miss 
important features of the normative world. 
 
                                                          
 131. Gerald Gaus, Review of Explaining Norms, NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS (2014), available at 
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/45998-explaining-norms/. Bicchieri also doubts the wisdom of establishing what is a 
“necessary and sufficient condition for being a norm,” given the “semantic vagueness surrounding the concept 
of norm is common to all social constructs.” Bicchieri & Muldoon, supra note 66.   
 132. See supra note 64.  
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